Richard Brown runs his court like a jackal circus!

________________________________________________________

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD LABARR JR                    (Also identified as EXH-2 in the complaint)

________________________________________________________

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., being over the age of Eighteen, under penalty of perjury attest the following: and move the court for an Order effectuating the removal of Judge Richard Brown from the Montrose Municipal Court (Hereafter: MMC) in Case NO: 50637 and from all future cases involving any member or relative of the LaBarr family. This action is brought on behalf of myself and my son, Donald LaBarr 3^rd, a seventeen year old minor, (at this date of filing).

As the party filing this affidavit, I have cause to believe and do believe that on account of the bias, prejudice, or personal interests exhibited by this judge, my son, Donald LaBarr 3^rd cannot and has not obtained fair and impartial judgements from the Montrose Municipal Court and has been subjected to the malfeasance of an individual who should not reside in the MMC venue. We demand to be freed of the threat of further reprisals and acts from this dishonest and disreputable individual ongoing in a venue where no recordings or transcripts are available. This setting mandates that only judges who hold paramount, the Canons of Justice may preside within. This specific nature of this problem creates a need for recording to be made available to subjects of Montrose Municipal Court.

The municipal Court should not be allowed the scope to ban recording devices if none are provided when the specific abusive behavior complained of lies in repetitive similar incidents and types of material misrepresentations. Mr. Brown’s moral depravity includes; saying one thing in an ongoing verbal agreement exchange and writing another. Then he appears as though he attempts to entrap his subjects in contempt of court. This pattern of behavior hasn’t changed since the 80s’ when he was an active county court judge. Both complaints involve repetitive Material Misrepresentation and are spelled out below;

Count-1: Material Misrepresentation and Attempted Entrapment

This complaint reflects a recorded collection regarding my first experience with Judge Richard Brown transpiring in an mid 70s’ event when this individual was an acting County Court Judge in a collection action on an old hospital bill. This incident involved 3 court events and on the second to the last one, Judge Brown had inscribed the wrong date on a court document which caused me to appear a day after the event wherein a default judgment had been affected against me by him the day before. The court date was on the 8^th of that month and Richard Brown clearly inscribed 9^th by closing the lower loop on the "8" character on the appearance date line.

The courtroom scene created through his egregious behavior was such that it more resembled an episode of "Saturday Night Live" than a courtroom, only, it was not funny at all and generated this clear, outstanding, lasting, lifelong memory. I appeared on the date inscribed on the court document and sat through all of the twenty or so cases that day. Around midday, at the end of the day’s court session in an emptied courtroom, Judge Brown was getting up from his desk and stood there and said, can I help you? I said, "Sir, the wrong date is on this paper." He snickered, glancing at the pair at the County Attorney’s table and gestured to approach. As I approached the bench I walked through the little swinging door past the County/District Attorney’s table where there was a Deputy Attorney and another non uniformed local cop with a crewcut who had his hand over his mouth like he was about to break out laughing, barely able to contain himself. He was at times, jolting back and forth in his seat and the attorney was also interacting.

Brown was seated again on the bench and now also had his hand over his mouth, snickering as I approached. I came up towards the right side of his desk where he was 2 or 3 feet away and upward to the right of me. He was still snickering and looking towards the cop and County Attorney’s table when he did this over exaggerated wink, with his right eye to his crowd at the table, then puts his hand down, turning towards me still snickering and then looked straight at me, his face suddenly went to this flat angry look and he said, "So, are you saying that judges are stupid." I replied, "No sir." The cop with the crewcut instantly began jolting and snickering, without any discipline from Brown. Mr. Brown then informed me that the judgement had been entered against me the day before. I couldn’t believe the level of conduct exhibited by this judge and the atmosphere of his court. I almost had a tear in my eye as I left the courtroom.

I examined the date again and it was definitely a "9" character which, I recall had an almost exaggerated top loop and two lines on the bottom loop which were close together clearly defining a "9", as though it had been doodled into "9." I submit that I was hoodwinked into appearing a day late and further experienced a clear attempt at entrapment into Contempt of Court causing me to have concern and reasonable fear of this person as a judge to this day. This is an outstanding clear recollection of this event, and in fact is my predominating all time memory of all the times I have seen him on the bench or in public. I am compelled to pursue this complaint now, as would any reasonable person.

Until October 1^st , 2005, we had NO idea this was even the same guy when we walked into the Montrose Municipal court in 2006 and experienced another dishonesty incident. His appearance has changed over the years and another member of our family has been victimized again through this judge’s practices as is outlined in incident number 2. We were unaware that this was the same man until afterwards, or we’d have initiated efforts for recusal prior to this event.

Count-2: Material Misrepresentation

Richard Brown openly lied in the court room pretending to be in agreement to the gist of an ongoing verbal agreement exchange wherein we’d agreed the "test" in question specified Alcohol Only, (which applied to the single [alcohol related] event and fell within accepted sentencing guidelines) and writing "Drug Test" which entailed a full spectrum fishing drug test. We left the court room believing this test was to be "alcohol only" -per our conversation- but noted Brown had written "Drug Test" in a manner which the very next person to examine the face of the document would see "drug test" with no ambiguity. We immediately corresponded with EXH-3: a letter clarifying that we’d only agreed to a sobriety test for alcohol only, and that in the conversation in the court we made No voluntary wavier of our Rights or protections under the Fourth. I noted that Brown appeared to be kinda smiling, but was gnashing his teeth at our hesitance to sign and during the (2) times we verbally clarified -in the court room- that this test was for Alcohol only. We were opposing this upon the advise of our attorney. Then we realized that Brown might attempt to construe our respect for Constitutional Rights as contempt of his court. The deceit, falsification and attempts at entrapment all describe the ongoing dishonest character of Richard Brown. We are also concerned that due to the abusive nature of Richard Brown, he may further attempt to construe these proceedings as a threat and may attempt further abuses of authority. Judge Brown’s activities also defile the character of the 7^th Judicial District as individual rights have become subject to unrestrained power and respect for law and the courts comes to be is destroyed. Brown’s untimely activities also are creating a backlash in another case, wherein the extra antagonization will have severe effects on several parties around the community in another ongoing case.

We demand to be freed of the threat of reprisals from this dishonest individual. We demand his immediate and unconditional recusal of this rogue from any court events whatsoever involving any member of the LaBarr family.

... Further, the affiant says naught.

________________________________________________________________

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of October, 2005

by; Donald Edward LaBarr Jr

_________________________

Donald E. LaBarr Jr.

________________________________________________________

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD LABARR JR

_______________________________________________________

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., affiant state:

I swear under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, that I am over the age of (18) years, and that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 14^th day of October, 2006, in Montrose, Colorado.

__________________________

__________________________

Donald LaBarr Jr.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this_____day

Of October, 2005 By Donald LaBarr Jr.

Witness my hand and official seal;

My commission expires: __________________________

_________________________

NOTARY PUBLIC

   This motion was filed today: October 14th, 2005:

CASE NO: 98247

______________________________________________________________

MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND CHANGE OF JUDGE

AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF

______________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., submit the attached affidavit and move the court for a change of judge. The recusal of The Honorable Judge Brown is demanded for the reasons stated in the affidavit;

Change of judge; grounds; affidavit;

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., the party filing the affidavit has cause to believe and does believe that on account of the bias, prejudice, or interest of the judge, Donald LaBarr 111, cannot obtain fair and impartial treatment in the Montrose Municipal Court.

Initially we wish to clarify that we have full intent to comply with any written sentencing order of the Montrose Municipal court and we have written a letter to the court on August 22, 2005 stating the same, See Exh-1; Any of our statements are not intended to be confused or misconstrued as contempt. The specific nature of our complaints regarding Judge Brown include attempts at Entrapment in Contempt.

An Affidavit of Prejudice is included. See Exh-2., which relates 2 separate complaints involving the same type of misconduct. Judge Brown has capriciously added extraneous requirements to the sentence which are unsupported by state statute and appear to be his personal policy, which he implements under color of law and are explained below.

This lack of protective legal structure within the Montrose Municipal Court, through specific privileges granted and deficiencies within the Montrose Municipal Code are being taken advantage of and abused by Judge Brown. ...Specifically, dishonesty issues in connection with colorful courtroom antics and egregious behaviors.

Judge Brown has capriciously added extraneous requirements to the sentence which are unsupported by state statute and appear to be his personal policy, which he implements under color of law.

The policy exercised by Judge Brown has exceeded the scope of the offense, and openly exceeded the extent of demands requested and expressed in court by the deputy City Attorney. The Constitutionality of the issues raised in this tack-on drug test policy also comes into contention with established 10^th Cir., court rulings and the ABA’s widely-accepted principles and sentencing standards, as it has NO relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted; CRS 18-3.13 (d), [derived from a probationary sentencing example] and is an apparent inappropriate application or interpolation of even the CRS 18-1.3-212 sentencing directives -usually associated and applied with felony convictions. In fact, Judge Richard Brown’s juvenile sentencing in this respect is commensurate with standard prison guidelines approved for management of adult felon inmates -inside state prison correctional facilities. We submit this fact as evidence of malfeasance.

Our experiences with Judge Brown have formed our opinions today, and these reasonable expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment are shared by other courts in Colorado, note the opinion of the court of Appeals Note: The 10^th Cir., Court of Appeals reviewed a volume of cases, each raising certain points and arguments in Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347. We’ll breeze through these, noting the highlighted lines show the consistency and unnecessary cruelty of Judge Brown’s sentencing policies in comparison with harsh D.O.C. guidelines for the management of adult felon inmates inside state correctional facilities.

Brown’s sentencing enhancements are appropriate for crimes like rape, murder, burglary, arson and serious felonies. Brown also suspended Donald lll’s driver’s license, (when he didn’t even have one and driving was not a factor whatsoever in the case).... Brown further proceeded to sentence young Donald to "Drunk Driving Impact Panel on September 14^th,." Which we missed and are terrified that Brown will further harass through modifications, reconfigurations or possibly drastic additions to the sentence which will stretch out the events for years, having a substantial impact on the entire family and household. Brown suspends the licence of one member of the household and then adds on lots on nuisance extras which cause harassment of the other members of the household as they lose work or make several inconvenient, extra trips into the fine City of Montrose. Shear harassment is part of the modus operandi of this person which compels us to pursue this complaint and demand for recusal.

Here are excerpts from the American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, all of which show the basis for acceptance of drug testing, all outline the applications of drug testing in criminal cases. ABSOLUTELY NONE of which sustain Brown’s personal policy and applications of these harsh control elements and tools in his Juvenile Court.
21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1157

§ 1157. Blood and other scientific tests

It is generally recognized that it is not a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination to require one who is accused of a crime to submit to such scientific tests as blood analysis, a paraffin wax test for the presence of gunpowder on the defendant's hands, urinalysis, or breath tests. In accordance with the general rule, it has been held that evidence of the results of tests measuring the amount of alcohol in blood or urine extracted from the defendant's person is admissible, that the defendant's blood (or body fluid) may be analyzed in order to determine the type for comparison with bloodstains (or body fluids) found at the scene of the crime, and that blood found on the defendant's person or clothes may be analyzed for comparison with the victim's blood."

Observation:
The fact that the defendant may not have known why he was asked to give a sample of a body fluid will not render evidence of the analysis thereof inadmissible.

(Judge Brown sets up a tack - on "Fishing Drug Test,)

"Assuming police exceeded scope of suspect's consent in using his blood sample to compare with blood found at burglary scene, rather than in connection with investigation of theft of golf carts, as was contemplated when consent was obtained, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not require exclusion of incriminating evidence obtained as a result of analyzing sample because police inevitably would have obtained a blood sample from suspect for use in connection burglary investigation. U.S.C.A. Amend. 4. Matter of Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1998).

"A sobriety test elicits a person's physical, rather than testimonial, response and, therefore, does not trigger the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S.C.A. Amend. 5. State v. Blouin, 716 A.2d 826 (Vt. 1998)."

"Blood test results, which were based upon blood drawn from defendant without his consent, and which ultimately led to his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), were not testimonial or communicative evidence subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Belgarde v. State of Mont., 123 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1997)."

"Trial court did not err in admitting results of blood tests and body examination of the defendant in a rape prosecution, where the record supported the conclusion of the court that the defendant voluntarily signed a waiver and consented to the examination. Loper v. State, 330 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1976)."

"Taking of blood from a violent offender or sex offender, pursuant to statute, for DNA profiling analysis, does not amount to compelling testimonial or communicative evidence, and thus, is not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997).

State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937)."

"Urine samples used by prison officials for drug testing constituted nontestimonial evidence and did not implicate the inmate's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1994)."

"A defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to give a urine sample to determine whether he or she has ingested narcotics. People v. Sarkissian, 81 Cal. App. 3d 660, 146 Cal. Rptr. 508 (5th Dist. 1978)."

"Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85, 163 A.L.R. 931 (1945) (holding that admission in evidence in a rape prosecution of testimony of an expert tending to show that blood taken from the coat of the accused could not have come from a third person as claimed by the accused, but was of the same type as the victim's blood, does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to refuse to testify against himself); Lorenz v. State, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965).

State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937) (urine)."

We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims, and also AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's due process claim. We REVERSE the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
C.A.10 (Colo.),1994.
Lucero v. Gunter
17 F.3d 1347

We must next determine whether the request that Plaintiff submit to a urinalysis violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. A urinalysis constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be conducted in a reasonable manner. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir.1986); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (holding blood testing for alcohol content a search).

"In determining whether a search of a prisoner is reasonable, we must "[balance] the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the [prisoner]," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1885, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and give prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in [their] adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878."
"The unauthorized use of narcotics in a detention center by inmates does pose a serious threat to prison officials' ability to maintain institutional security. Cf. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588-89, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3233-34, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984) (indicating the unauthorized use of narcotics is a problem in many penal and detention centers). Consequently, prison officials have a "significant and legitimate" interest in preventing unauthorized drug use among prison inmates. We therefore hold that the random urine collection and testing of prisoners is a reasonable means of combating the unauthorized use of narcotics and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 113 S.Ct. 1362, 122 L.Ed.2d 741 (1993); Spence, 807 F.2d at 755; see also Ramey v. Hawk, 730 F.Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D.N.C.1989); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y.1984)."

However, in the instant case, the record is insufficiently developed for us to determine whether the request was based on random selection or was otherwise permissible under the Fourth Amendment as applied to prisoners. Thus, because it is not obvious to us that Plaintiff "could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief," see Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1190, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and we must remand to the district court for further proceedings as are necessary.

"Plaintiff first argues that prison officials' requests that he submit to a urinalysis constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Because Plaintiff did not submit to the urinalysis, we must first determine whether Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were nevertheless implicated because he was punished for his refusal to submit to the urinalysis. Although no court has addressed this issue with regard to prisoners, several courts have held that a government employee may properly raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to an employer's order to undergo a urine screen when adverse consequences follow if that order is not obeyed. See Jackson v. Gates, 975 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir.1992) (firing of public employee after his refusal to submit to urinalysis sufficient to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to the test), cert. denied,509 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 2996, 125 L.Ed.2d 690 (1993); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir.1987)."

"(Fourth Amendment challenge properly raised when employee's continued employment was contingent upon submission to a search); see also Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F.Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J.1988) (Fourth Amendment challenge properly raised when refusal to submit to urine test would end plaintiffs' tenure with the National Guard).
In the instant case, Plaintiff suffered adverse consequences by failing to submit to a urinalysis in that DOC officials charged Plaintiff with disobeying a lawful order and assessed punitive segregation and loss of good time credits. Because of these adverse consequences and in light of the government employee cases, we hold that Plaintiff may properly raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the request for a urinalysis."

Inmate's allegation that prison officials' request that he submit to urinalysis was unreasonable search under Fourth Amendment was sufficient to state § 1983 civil rights claim, absent indication in record whether request was based on random selection or was otherwise permissible under Fourth Amendment as applied to prisoners.

Urinalysis constitutes "search" for purposes of Fourth Amendment and therefore must be conducted in reasonable manner.

...Judge Brown includes a "fishing expedition," or face entrapment in contempt of his court...

...The 10^th Circuit Court of Appeals continues;

We must next determine whether the request that Plaintiff submit to a urinalysis violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. A urinalysis constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be conducted in a reasonable manner.

We demand the recusal of Judge Richard Brown and recommend suspension and disbarment for the pattern of misconduct outlined in the attached affidavit of prejudice including false statements, multiple offenses, egregious behavior, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Brown exploits the vulnerability of his victim, taking advantage of persons or families who fall below a certain education level, (in respect to their ability to understand the deceptive hooks) and those below a certain income level, (in respect to their abilities to afford adequate legal protection). This opinion is derived from a 1996 interview with a Hispanic Delta family, whom had been handed one of Brown’s dynamic sentences.

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

(7) A judge may authorize:

(a) The use of electronic or photographic means for the perpetuation of a record, or for purposes of judicial administration;

(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings.

(8) Judicial Supervision over Expanded Media Coverage of Court Proceedings. A judge may authorize expanded media coverage of court proceedings, in addition to those referred to in section (7) of this Canon, subject to the guidelines set forth below.

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:

 

(II) "Photograph" and "photography" means all recording or broadcasting of visual images, by means of still photographs, videotape, television broadcasts, motion pictures, or otherwise. Judge Brown’s specific type of deceptive behavior complained of, specifically prohibits recording devices. Judge Brown DENIED our inquiry regarding recording devices in the court room, See Exh - 3 We have the Right to be free of this manner of misconduct. The Montrose Municipal Court is a venue wherein only the most honorable of Judges may reside.

 

Respectfully Submitted, This 14^th, day of October, 2005,

 

By_________________________

Donald LaBarr Jr.

 

 

 

 

Certificate of Service

______________________________________________________

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., certify that on October 14^th, 2005, I Hand Delivered, or placed in the United States Mail, foregoing MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND CHANGE OF JUDGE AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF with proper postage prepaid, to the following:

______________________________________________________

Montrose Municipal Court

P. O. Box 27

Montrose, CO 81402-0027

 

Judicial Performance Commission
c/o Jim Clayton, District Administrator
7th Judicial District
Montrose County Justice Center
1200 N. Grand Ave., Bin A
Montrose, Colorado 81401

 

18559 6600 Rd.

Montrose, CO 81401

Dear Sirs;

The purpose of this letter is to clarify that we have full intent to comply with any written sentencing order of the Montrose Municipal court. Any of our statements in the letter to Montrose’s Municipal Court, dated August 12^th, 2005 are not intended to be confused or misconstrued as contempt.

The City of Montrose through it’s codes, practices and policies, or lack thereof, provides a Municipal Court with all the bite of the neighboring State District Court, yet lacks any of the necessary accompanying remedial provisions and features provided by the state courts for addressing issues which go with this extra power, like no trial by jury, no appeal, no provisions for filing an Affidavit of Prejudice or for change or removal of a judge. This lack of protective legal structure is being taken advantage of and abused by Judge Brown. This letter is necessary due to the notorious past disreputations of both Jerry and Richard Brown. ...Specifically flagrant dishonesty issues in connection with colorful courtroom antics and intolerable behaviors.

As Judge Brown has capriciously added extraneous requirements to the sentence which are unsupported by state statute and appear to be his personal policy, an Affidavit of Prejudice will be filed separately (from this court event) with the State Judiciary Dept and respective agencies for prosecution. A second, separate legal action addressing these wanton Civil Rights encroachments and potential civil liabilities for the City of Montrose will also be filed separately, (from this court event).

If there are any questions regarding anything, please feel free to contact us.

Very Truly Yours;

____________________________

Donald LaBarr Jr.

City of Montrose

Montrose Municipal Court

433 South First St.

Montrose, CO 81402

Donald E. LaBarr Jr..

Montrose, CO 81401

August 12th, 2005

Montrose Municipal Court

P. O. Box 27

Montrose, CO 81402-0027

CASE NO: 98247

Dear Sirs;

The purpose of this letter is to clarify the verbatim and final agreement in this sentence. Donald LaBarr III, in good faith has signed the sentencing agreement with the full understanding of our verbatim clarifying that the testing agreed upon specifies "Alcohol Only" and to preemptively address any disparity which may potentially arise regarding this at the time of testing.

In our courtroom verbatim, Donald III readily agreed to take a test for Alcohol after conviction in this Alcohol related offense as it has a reasonable relationship to the offense. Donald III did not voluntarily, through any agreement, verbal or otherwise agree to extraneous testing other than alcohol, nor voluntarily relinquished any of his Rights, protections and/or privileges provided in the 4^th, 5^th and 14^th Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Any perception that "The Testing" We, (the LaBarr’s and the court) agreed upon voluntarily included extraneous add-on full-spectrum drug testing for any substance other that Alcohol, at the time Donald III signed the sentencing agreement constitutes a material misrepresentation of our verbatim. It is noted that Judge Brown wrote "Drug Test" on the sentencing document which could potentially be misconstrued.

The policy expressed by Judge Brown also has exceeded the scope of the offense, and openly exceeded the extent of demands requested and expressed in court by the deputy City Attorney. The Constitutionality of the issues raised in this tack-on drug test policy also comes into contention with established 10^th Cir., court rulings and the ABA’s widely-accepted principles and sentencing standards, as it has NO relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted; CRS 18-3.13 (d), [derived from a probationary sentencing example] and is an apparent inappropriate application or interpolation of even the CRS 18-1.3-212 sentencing directives -usually associated and applied with felony convictions.

It appears that Judge Brown, acting as The Moving Force of his governmental entity employers; The City of Montrose and their respective officials, and acting on their behalf in reflecting their policies, has generated for them an actionable legal question as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in addition to highlighting his questionable practices being utilized to achieve the goal of asserting an unconstitutional extraneous drug testing policy. All leading to civil damages, further injury and civil liability.

I, Donald LaBarr Jr., will outline further personal damages throughout the sentence term and state that this severely prejudices my disposition in other impending litigation.

Thank you for your prompt attention in this matter and we look forward to your letter of response clarifying this issue.

Very Truly Yours;

_______________________________

Donald LaBarr Jr.

_________________________________________________________________

cc:

City of Montrose

Montrose Municipal Court

433 South First St.

Montrose, CO 81402

Colorado Judicial Department
1301 Pennsylvania Ave, Suite 300

Denver, CO 80203

Bill Owens, Governor
136 State Capitol
Denver, CO 80203-1792